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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of hedging and speculative pressures on the transition of the spot-
futures relationship in metal and energy markets. We build a Markov regime switching (MRS) model 
where hedging and speculative pressures affect the transition probabilities between a stronger and 
weaker spot-futures relationship. It is found that hedging pressure increases the likelihood of 
transition, i.e. destabilises the existing spot-futures relationship, while speculative pressure reduces it, 
i.e. stabilises the relationship, in the copper, crude oil and natural gas markets, but this effect is 
relatively weak in the silver and heating oil markets. We also examine whether these findings 
generate practical benefits by testing the hedging effectiveness of the minimum variance hedge ratios 
(MVH) derived from the MRS models with hedging and speculative pressures. A relatively strong 
reduction of the portfolio variance, hedger’s utility and value at risk (VaR) is observed in the energy 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
In the commodity markets where the spot (cash) and the futures markets are closely linked, a 
price change in the spot market will simply be echoed in the futures market if a constant equilibrium   
exists between two markets, which is known as ‘the spot-future parity’(Sarno & Valente, 2000). This 
can be expressed in simple logarithmic form as: 
𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡) (1) 
where Ft,T is the logarithmic price of a futures contract at time t which expires at time T, St is the 
logarithm of spot price at time t, and r is the interest rate. In the spot-future parity, the percentage 
changes in both St and Ft,T will be equal since the coefficient of St is one. However, this does not mean 
that the spot and the futures prices will be identical. The difference between the spot and the 
corresponding futures prices, (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡), is defined as ‘the basis’ (Fama & French, 1987). The basis 
is equal to the interest foregone, 𝑟𝑟(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡), in Equation (1). More generally, the basis is a combination 
of the interest foregone during storage, the marginal storage cost and the marginal convenience yield, 
according to the theory of storage (Fama & French, 1988), or alternatively the sum of an expected 
premium as a forecast bias and an expected change in the spot price (Fama & French, 1987), in the 
expectancy model.  
The components of the basis may vary as the market experiences shocks (Fama & French, 1987). 
Some components may exhibit a switching behaviour similar to a market cycle between two states 
(McQueen & Thorley, 1991), while others reflect random supply and demand shocks. The change in 
the basis can then be modelled as: 
𝛥𝛥�𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇 − 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡� = 𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇 − 𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡′ + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡′   (2) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
′  represents the amount of the change in the basis in a state St and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡′  is the random error term 
at time t.  
The assumption of constant equilibrium between the spot and the future returns (ΔF and ΔS) in 
Equations (1) and (2) can be relaxed by adding a coefficient φ for ΔF, which follows the transition of 
𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
′ . Rearranging Equation (2) for ΔS then it yields1:  
𝛥𝛥𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝛥𝛥𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡,𝑇𝑇 + 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 (3) 
                                                     
1 This specification is consistent with the price discovery role of the futures prices for spot market transactions 
(Garbade & Silber, 1983) as discussed in the hedge ratio literature.  
3 
 
where 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = −𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡′  ,𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 = −𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡′  and 𝜑𝜑𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is expected to be unity in equilibrium. This is an empirical model 
for ‘the spot-futures relationship’, which also can help to find hedger’s minimum variance hedge ratio 
(φ) in the futures market.  
Following Hamilton (1989)’s seminal work, the transitional or cyclical economic behaviour has 
been frequently modelled using a Markov regime switching (MRS) model, e.g., McQueen & Thorley 
(1991), Gray (1996), among many others. The transition of the spot-futures relationship in Equation 
(3) has also been modelled by Markov switching models by a large body of existing literature. For 
example, Sarno & Valente (2000) show that a MRS model appropriately captures the dynamic spot-
futures relationship in the oil market. The MRS model is revealed to improve the performance of the 
minimum variance hedge (MVH) ratios (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2004; Chen & Tsay, 2011). Since 
Klaassen (2002) finds that a MRS-GARCH model can significantly improve the performance of 
volatility forecasting in the foreign exchange markets, MRS-GARCH-based models are also used for 
modelling commodity futures markets (Alizadeh, Nomikos, & Pouliasis, 2008; Lee, 2009, 2010; Pan, 
Wang, & Yang, 2014; Philip & Shi, 2016).  
The transition probabilities govern a transition between states (or regimes) in a MRS model and 
can be time-varying, conditional on other variables such as the average basis (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 
2004). However, according to Filardo (1998), the information variables in the transition probability 
equations should be ‘contemporaneously conditionally uncorrelated with the unobserved state, St’ to 
have the consistent and asymptotically normal MLE estimators. The use of the basis-based measures 
in both mean and transition probability equations as Alizadeh & Nomikos (2004) may be a concern 
particularly because the mean equation itself is a general form of the change in the basis, as seen in 
Equations (2) and (3). This necessitates the use of an alternative variable specifically in the transition 
probability equation. The investors’ hedging and speculative pressures (a.k.a. trading pressures) in the 
futures market, measured by actual positions taken by investors such as the trading pressure index 
developed by Wang (2001) and the net percentage long position used by De Roon et al. (2000), could 
have weaker correlation with unobserved states since the trading pressures are not technically 
converted to the mean equations like basis. However, note that past trading pressures may be still 
correlated to the state of the market 2, e.g. stronger long trading pressure in the previous day is 
correlated with state 2. If this is the case, as recommended by Filardo (1994, 1998), the mean and the 
transition probability equations is jointly estimated to avoid this issue. On the other hand, the trading 
pressure may have a stronger and more direct impact on the transition than the basis-based measures. 
This is because the traders’ positions would lead to actual trading in the future since they have to 
                                                     
2 The average correlations between regime probabilities and the associated trading pressures are low, i.e. below 
0.04, in all 6 sample markets in this study.  
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close out the positions and thus may more strongly affect the transition probabilities of the spot-future 
relationship. 
Futures markets provide hedging opportunities for the holders of underlying assets and highly 
rewarding speculative opportunities to other traders. For example, hedgers take a short position in the 
futures market to reduce the risk associated with the initial long position in spot markets (Hirshleifer, 
1990). As speculators enter the market on the opposite side of the contracts as counterparties to 
hedgers, hedging pressure in the futures markets is related to the hedger’s risk premium paid to 
speculators when transferring  non-marketable risk (De Roon et al., 2000). As hedgers can take a long 
or short position in the futures market to decrease the price or income risk, the overall impact is 
determined by their net positions, which is known as ‘hedging pressure’ (De Roon et al., 2000). In the 
agricultural and foreign exchange futures markets, net long hedging pressure is found to have a 
negative relationship with subsequent returns (Wang, 2001, 2004).  Likewise, ‘speculative pressure’, 
represented by speculators’ net position, can also affect spot prices (Parsons, 2010), futures prices 
(Kaufmann, 2011; Wang, 2004), and futures market volatility (Cifarelli & Paladino, 2011) in various 
markets. Therefore, we expect trading pressures have an impact on the relationship between spot and 
futures prices. If traders’ reaction to trading pressures symmetrically affects spot and futures prices to 
the same extent, the previous spot-futures relationship may still hold, but when their response is 
asymmetric, the spot-futures relationship can change to another state.  
 However, little research has been conducted to reveal the impact of hedging and speculative 
pressures on the transition of the spot-futures relationship. In order to fill this gap, this paper 
investigates, for the first time, whether hedging and speculative pressures affect the transition 
probabilities of the spot-futures relationship using a MRS error correction model of spot and futures 
returns, which makes the first contribution of this paper. Our study differs from Alizadeh &  Nomikos’ 
(2004) investigation of hedge ratios by using the trading pressures instead of basis to determine the 
regime transmission probabilities. We use two different measures of hedging and speculative 
pressures: the investor trading pressure index (Wang, 2004); and the net percentage long position (De 
Roon et al., 2000) with five different moving windows.  Secondly, we apply our model in three metal 
(copper, gold and silver) and three energy (crude oil, heating oil and natural gas) markets3 and further 
investigate whether hedging and speculative pressure can improve the performance of the minimum 
variance hedge ratio (MVH). Earlier empirical evidence has already shown that simple MRS models 
can provide the time-varying MVH that improves hedging effectiveness in several spot and futures 
markets over static OLS and multivariate GARCH alternatives (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2004;  
Alizadeh et al., 2008; Lien, 2009). However, multivariate GARCH models often underperform static 
                                                     
3 We focus on these markets because the data used to construct trading pressure measures are only available for 
some commodity markets. See Section 3 for detailed explanations. 
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OLS models (Alexander & Barbosa, 2007; Copeland & Zhu, 2010). More complicated MRS-GARCH 
models could outperform the static OLS strategy (Alizadeh et al., 2008; Salvador & Aragó, 2014; 
Philip & Shi, 2016), but they often incur high transaction costs ( Lee & Yoder, 2007; Lee, 2010). 
This paper finds that hedging and speculative pressures are statistically significant in determining 
the transition of the spot-futures relationship in most of the cases in copper, gold, crude oil and natural 
gas markets but relatively weakly in silver and heating oil markets. Net long hedging pressure tends to 
increase the transition probability, while net long speculative pressure decreases it in five out of the 
six markets, with the exception of gold markets. That is, net long hedgers are more likely to trigger 
the transition of the existing spot-futures relationship, but net long speculators are more likely to 
sustain the current relationship. Moreover, the pressure measures are statistically stronger than the 
basis measures when tested them together in the transition probability equations. However, 
heterogeneities are also found across different commodity markets. For example, in the gold market, 
which serves as a safe-haven asset, the results show that hedging pressures decrease the chance of 
transition while speculative pressures increase it, indicating the unique characteristics of hedgers and 
speculators operating in the gold market. This may be because traders in the gold market are more 
subject to government policies and macroeconomic factors such as inflation and exchange rate risk 
(Ciner, 2001).  In addition, net long hedging pressure is more likely to trigger a transition to a stronger 
spot-futures relationship in the copper market, but to a weaker relationship in the energy markets.  
We derive the MVHs using the MRS models with hedging and speculative pressures in the 
transition probability equations and test their hedging performances against various benchmark 
strategies including: naïve hedge; OLS; univariate GARCH; multivariate GARCH; and the MRS 
without pressure measures. We test in-sample and out-of-sample performances using different 
performance measures: portfolio variance; utility level; and value-at-risk (VaR). The reduction in the 
portfolio variance and utility is greatest in the energy markets on average, followed by the metal 
markets, which also perform well. The reduction in the VaR is largest in both the metal and energy 
markets. In terms of the performance in individual commodity markets, hedging performance 
improvements are observed to be relatively strong in the copper, silver, crude oil and natural gas 
markets. Out-of-sample performance is found to be better than in-sample results, indicating that 
trading pressures are good indicators for future spot and futures price movements.  
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 explains how the measures of 
hedging and speculative pressures are created and the methodology to test their impact on the 
transition of the spot-futures relationship. Section 3 describes the data generated for empirical analysis. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 utilises the minimum variance hedge (MVH) ratios 
derived in Section 4 and analyses their hedging effectiveness. Section 6 concludes this paper.  
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2. Hedging and speculative pressures and the transition of the spot-futures 
relationship 
Following Wang (2001, 2004), hedging and speculative pressures in the futures markets are 
calculated based on traders’ open interests, which are measured by the number of contracts not closed 
on a specific day. The distinction between hedging and speculative pressures is commonly made by 
the types of traders who have open interests. For the US commodity futures markets, the 
Commitments of Traders (CoT) reports of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
formally summarise two types of large reportable traders’ open interests: commercial; and non-
commercial traders. A commercial trader is defined as a trader who ‘uses futures contracts in that 
particular commodity for hedging’ and ‘where they are economically appropriate to the reduction of 
risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enterprise’ (The CFTC, 2016). All other 
reportable traders are classified as non-commercial traders whose main purpose is speculating. 
Commercial traders’ open interests form the basis for measuring hedging pressure while non-
commercial traders’ open interests are used to measure speculative pressure. 
However, open interest cannot easily be compared across markets or over time since it is an 
absolute measure. To overcome this problem, Wang (2001, 2004) constructs the following measures 
of trading pressure for hedgers and speculators.4 His indices (HSI and SSI) are calculated as follows: 
, ,
,
, ,
min( , )
max( , ) min( , )
j j
C t C tj
t k j j
C t C t
NOI NOI k
HSI
NOI k NOI k
−
=
−
  (4) 
, ,
,
, ,
min( , )
max( , ) min( , )
j j
N t N tj
t k j j
N t N t
NOI NOI k
SSI
NOI k NOI k
−
=
−
  (5) 
where j is a commodity indicator, t is the time index, and k is the length of moving window used to 
calculate a historical maximum and minimum. Net open interest (NOI) is calculated by subtracting 
short open interest (SOI) from long open interest (LOI). In particular, NOIC and NOIN are commercial 
and non-commercial traders’ net open interests, respectively. NOI has a positive value if the traders’ 
long positions are larger than their short positions, while it has a negative value if they have relatively 
                                                     
4  Hedging and speculative pressures are technically different from investor sentiment which is normally 
measured by a survey of analysts (Clarke & Statman, 1998; Fisher & Statman, 2000). Investor sentiment, such 
as optimism, pessimism or psychological foundations (Baker & Wurgler, 2007), can partly drive hedging and 
speculative pressures, but we assume that risk transfers or speculative profits are the main drivers. 
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larger short positions. Historical minimum (min) and maximum (max) values of NOI are identified 
over a moving window from t-k to t, e.g., k is 1 year in Wang’s studies (2001, 2004). The value of 
HSI and SSI lies between 0 and 1. If its value is higher, this indicates that net long positions are closer 
to a historical high in a moving window while a lower value means that it is closer to a historical low. 
HSI and SSI essentially measure the relative long hedging or speculative pressure at time t against the 
historical maximum and minimum net open interest.  
In another aspect, De Roon et al.’s (2000) net percentage long position is also adopted to measure 
hedging and speculative pressures. The k-week average hedging and speculative pressures (AHGP 
and ASCP) at time t are defined as:   
1 1
, , ,
,
0 0, , ,
1 1j j jk kC t i C t i C t ij
t k j j j
i iC t i C t i C t i
LOI SOI NOI
AHGP
k LOI SOI k TOI
− −
− − −
= =− − −
−
= =
+∑ ∑  (6) 
1 1
, , ,
.
0 0, , ,
1 1j j jk kN t i N t i N t ij
t k j j j
i iN t i N t i N t i
LOI SOI NOI
ASCP
k LOI SOI k TOI
− −
− − −
= =− − −
−
= =
+∑ ∑  (7) 
where TOI is the total open interest as the sum of long and short open interests. AHGP and ASCP are 
an average of the long-position version of the normalised net short exposure (Ruf, 2012). It should be 
noted that we switch LOI and SOI in the original formula to create a net long exposure that is 
compatible with HSI and SSI. The value of AHGP and ASCP lies between -1 and 1. AHGP and 
ASCP measure the average relative long hedging or speculative pressure over time t, but against the 
average total open interest over past k periods. They are also essentially the measures of trading 
pressures, which are similar to HSI and SSI.  
The dynamic impact of hedging and speculative pressures on the spot-futures relationship is 
modelled using a Markov regime switching model as developed in Equation (3). Considering two 
regimes or states of the spot-futures relationship (st=1 and 2)5 and the state-dependent variance of the 
normally-distributed error term, Equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
,t t tt s s t t s
S F uµ ϕ∆ = + ∆ +  (8) 
where 2, ~ (0, )t tt s su N σ . 
                                                     
5  The three-state models are tested, but they are not preferred to the two-state models in terms of Schwarz 
information criterion or they fail to provide unique coefficients. These results are consistent with Alizadeh & 
Nomikos (2004). 
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Following Salvador & Arago (2014), we also modify the mean equation, Equation (8), by adding 
the lagged basis as the error correction term because cointegration between the spot and futures price 
is expected to exist due to their parity condition shown in Equation (1).  
1 ,t t t tt s s t s t t s
S F b uµ ϕ λ −∆ = + ∆ + +  (9) 
where 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 , which is now defined as the basis. The coefficient λst shows the speed of 
adjustment in each state or the short-term within-state dynamics of the relationship, and φ represents a 
short-term spot-futures relationship. In the meantime, the between-state dynamics are captured by 
switching all coefficients including φ and the transition probabilities as explained below. Equation (9) 
is used as the mean equation in the following analysis. Note that state 1 can be now defined as the 
state closer to the short-term equilibrium, i.e. φ is closer to 1, and state 2 is the state with some degree 
of deviations. Therefore, state 1 and 2 are simply defined as the states with stronger and weaker short-
term spot-futures relationship, respectively. 
It is also necessary to specify how a state (st) or a regime behaves, which in turn determines the 
state-specific spot-futures relationship. The state variable st evolves through a first-order Markov 
process (Hamilton, 1989), as commonly assumed in the MRS models. That is, a current state depends 
on only one immediately preceding state that implicitly contains all the information about past states, 
as shown below.  
1 1 2Pr( | ) Pr( | , ,...)t t t t ts s s s s− − −=  (10) 
where Pr is the (conditional) probability of being in one state.  
A transition between states is governed by transition probabilities. When the transition 
probabilities are constant, they can be defined as follows: 
1 11
1 12 11
1 21 22
1 22
Pr( 1| 1)
Pr( 2 | 1) 1
Pr( 1| 2) 1
Pr( 2 | 2)
t t
t t
t t
t t
s s p
s s p p
s s p p
s s p
−
−
−
−
= = =
 = = = = −
 = = = = −
 = = =
 (11) 
where pij provides the probability that state i will be followed by state j. 
However, transition probabilities are likely to be time-varying if hedging and speculative pressure 
can influence the spot-futures relationship. For example, traders’ pressure may accelerate the 
transition of the spot-futures relationship if they take opposite positions in the spot and futures 
markets and consequently increase price differentials between the two markets. However, if traders 
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take the same positions in both markets to make arbitrage or speculative profits, the current spot-
futures price relationship may be more likely to hold.  
Time-varying transition probabilities are modelled in a separate transition probability equation 
that accommodates exogenous variables (Diebold, Lee, & Weinbach, 1994) or random coefficients 
(Lee, Yoder, Mittelhammer, & McCluskey, 2006). We adopt the first method to allow the impact of 
hedging and speculative pressures to be investigated using separate equations. Following Diebold et al. 
(1994) and Marsh (2000), the transition probabilities between two states in Equation (11) can be 
further specified as6:  
1 11 0 1 1
1 12 11 0 1 1
1 21 22 1 2 1
1 22 1 2 1
Pr( 1| 1) 1 ( )
Pr( 2 | 1) 1 ( )
Pr( 1| 2) 1 ( )
Pr( 2 | 2) 1 ( )
t t t
t t t
t t t
t t t
s s p c TP
s s p p c TP
s s p p c TP
s s p c TP
β
β
β
β
− −
− −
− −
− −
= = = = −Φ +
 = = = = − = Φ +
 = = = = − = Φ +
 = = = = −Φ +
 (12) 
where Φ is a logistic function, ( ) 1/ (1 exp( ))x xΦ = + , c’s and β’s are coefficients and TPt are the 
measures of trading (hedging and speculative) pressures (HSI, SSI, AHGP and ASCP). The transition 
probabilities are now time-varying and depending on the degree of long hedging or speculative 
pressures. The study of Alizadeh & Nomikos (2004) shows that transition probabilities depend on the 
4-week average basis as the basis may have the power to explain some of the spot and futures price 
movement (Fama and French, 1987). The spot and futures basis and their 4-week average basis are 
used as benchmark measures. 
Equation (12) specifies that net long pressure (higher HSI/SSI and positive AHGP/ASCP) and net 
short pressure (lower HSI/SSI and negative AHGP/ASCP) have opposite impacts on the transition 
probability. This is because hedgers and speculators are likely to trade with each other in the futures 
market. That is, net long hedging pressure is correlated to net short speculative pressure, and net short 
hedging pressure is correlated with net long speculative pressure. Thus, if net long hedging and 
speculative pressures have contrasting effects on the transition of the spot-futures relationship7, the 
adoption of net long and net short positions by the same type of traders will also have the opposite 
effect. For the sake of simplicity, only net long pressure will be used hereafter.  
In Equation (12), statistically significant coefficients β1 and β2 mean that hedging or speculative 
pressure affects the transition of the spot-futures relationship. In particular, a significantly positive β1 
                                                     
6 p12 and p21 are specified as a logistic function, unlike (1-logistic function) shown in their papers. However, the 
logistic regressions in the two specifications are the same. We adopt the specification in this paper because the 
focus of this study is on the transition probabilities to the alternative state, and β1 and β2  can  directly correspond 
to p12 and p21. See Alizadeh & Nomikos (2004).  
7 The empirical analysis conducted in this study confirms this finding.  
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indicates that net long hedging or speculative pressure tends to initiate a transition from state 1 to state 
2, while a positive β2 means that the transition probability from state 2 to state 1 is increased. The 
parameters are estimated by the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method (see Diebold et al. 
(1994) for technical details). In addition, the use of lagged pressure variables in the transition 
probability equations is also likely to satisfy the contemporaneous conditional erogeneity condition 
that could invalidate the results obtained from the MLE (Filardo, 1998).  
 
3. The data 
The Commitment of Traders (CoT) report of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) is a weekly report containing open interest data, which is released at 3:30pm on each Friday, 
based on the Tuesday data in the same week. The CoT reports are available for commodity futures 
contracts such as energy, metal and agricultural products, in addition to other assets like interest rates, 
equities and the foreign exchange futures contracts. This study focuses on energy and metal futures 
markets since they have a higher relative size of open interest to trading volume8 and, consequently, 
the impact of open interest on the transition of the spot-futures relationship is likely to be stronger. 
Additionally, agricultural futures markets are excluded since they may be more exposed to the effects 
of seasonality due to the cost of storage (Fama & French, 1987). The change of spot and futures 
relationship may be due to the strong impact of seasonality. Furthermore, to avoid a potential impact 
of thin trading (Holmes & Rougier, 2005), energy and metal futures markets with a relatively high 
volume are used in the analysis. The data for the CoT reports are collected from clearing members, 
reporting dealers and brokers. They are classified into commercial and non-commercial traders’ open 
interests as described in Section 2. Non-reportable positions are the difference between the total open 
interest and reportable positions, and because their classification is formally unknown, they are 
excluded from our analysis9.   
The data are obtained from six futures markets and their corresponding spot markets: three metal 
futures markets for copper (high grade), gold (100oz) and silver (5000oz) on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange; and three energy futures markets for crude oil (light), heating oil and natural gas on the 
New York Mercantile Exchange. A continuous series of futures settlement prices are used, which roll 
                                                     
8 The ratios of open interest to average daily trade volume in our sample are 4.13 (copper), 3.37 (gold), 3.57 
(silver), 2.75 (crude oil), 3.02 (heating oil) and 4.31 (natural gas). These are higher than futures contacts most-
traded in the other categories such as e-mini S&P500 (equity, 1.24), 10-year T-note (interest rate, 2.97) and 
Euro (foreign currency, 1.11) on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 
9 These may be regarded as small speculators’ positions, but because their impact is likely to be minimal it can 
safely be excluded.  
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over on the first day of the contract month to the futures price with the next nearest maturity date to 
avoid rolling-over on the expiry date which may cause excessive volatility (Ma, Mercer, & Walker, 
1992)10. Friday prices are used since we also investigate a practical use of the CoT report that is 
published earlier on the same day. The sample period is from 1 March 1996 to 14 March 2014 (942 
weekly observations). The first 842 observations are used for in-sample analysis and the last 100 
observations of both the prices and open interest series are reserved as an out-of-sample forecasting 
period. Both the price and open interest data are obtained from DataStream.  
The patterns of the spot and the futures prices in six commodity markets are depicted in Figure 1 
and Figure 2. The spot and the futures prices for the same commodity look identical, as would be 
expected from the theoretical relationship described in Section 1. The overall patterns seen in each 
group of commodities (metal and energy) are roughly similar. Specifically, gold and silver in the 
metal markets and crude oil and heating oil in the energy markets show a strong similarity, but each 
commodity market has its own distinctive movements to some degree.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
The descriptive statistics for the spot and futures returns are summarised in Table 1. Although the 
mean returns are similar for the spot and the corresponding futures markets, a difference exists in the 
standard deviation between the two markets, which may indicate a degree of variability in the spot-
futures relationship, except for the gold market. All the pairs of spot and futures prices are 
cointegrated with the coefficient very close to 1. This shows the existence of the long-term spot-
futures relationship and also supports the use of the error correction model in the mean equation 
(Equation (9)).  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
The time-series patterns of hedgers’ (commercial traders) and speculators’ (non-commercial 
traders) net open interests (NOI) are depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively. They show a 
stronger heterogeneity across the markets than the price data. Net open interests are used to calculate 
hedging and speculative pressures such as HSI, SSI, AHGP and ASCP, as defined in Section 2. The 
average correlation between hedgers’ net long and speculators’ net short open interests in all six 
markets is -0.97, showing that they are likely to be a counterparty in trading futures contracts.   
                                                     
10 The choice of roll-over methods may lead to different time-series properties of continuous price series (Ma, 
Mercer, & Walker, 1992). However, since no evidence has been presented for the best method, this study adopts 
a simpler roll-over method without price adjustment that may cause biases in variances and correlation (Ma et 
al., 1992). On the other hand, the absence of maturity effect in the commodity futures markets (Daal, Farhat, & 
Wei, 2006) may alleviate the impact of different roll-over methods (Carchano & Pardo, 2009). 
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(Insert Figure 3 here) 
(Insert Figure 4 here) 
The measures of hedging and speculative pressure are calculated using the formulae given in 
Equations (4), (5), (6) and (7). For all four measures, 50-week and 4-week moving windows are used. 
A 50-week (one year) moving window is chosen to represent the long-term trading pressure or the 
trading pressure when settlements dates are within the next 50 weeks which covers most of futures 
trading volume. It also corresponds with the length originally used in Wang (2001)’s measurement. 
For the comparison with the 4-week average basis used by Alizadeh & Nomikos (2004), the 4-week 
AHGP and ASCP are also used.11 A 4-week moving window is for short-term trading pressure when 
settlement dates are with the next 4 weeks, which fits with a traditional monthly cycle. For Markov 
switching models, a state in which a stronger spot-futures relationship exists is defined as ‘state 1’, 
while the alternative state in which a weaker relationship exists becomes ‘state 2’. The descriptive 
statistics of all the measures of hedging and speculative pressures, NOIs and TOIs are summarised in 
Table 2. It is shown that the HSI and SSI measures are around 0.5 and the standard deviations are 
smaller than the corresponding means. This suggests the HSI and SSI measures are relative stable. 
AHGPs are generally negative and ASCPs are mostly positive, except for natural gas market, which 
has opposite signs compared to other markets. The deviations of AHGPs and ASCPs are larger than 
corresponding means, implying these measures are more volatile. The open interests are sizeable for 
gold, crude oil and natural gas markets; however, the net open interest for natural gas is relatively 
small. In addition, natural gas is the only one out of the 6 markets who has a positive net open interest, 
i.e. long position is more than the short position. This indicates that the investors in natural gas market 
may behave differently from other markets. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
4. Empirical results 
The estimation results of the MRS models with hedging and speculative pressures, obtained from 
Equations (9) and (12), are presented in Table 3 and summarised in Table 4. It shows the importance 
of pressure measures in determining the transition of the spot-futures relationship in general. 
Particularly in copper, gold and crude oil markets, the measures of trading pressure significantly 
affect transition probabilities in 22 out of 30 cases in terms of significant β1 or β2. On the other hand, 
                                                     
11 4-week HSI and SSI are not used because finding a historical maximum/minimum over 4 observations may 
generate excessive variability in the values.  
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they show relatively weak degree of the significance in silver, heating oil and natural gas markets only 
in 9 out of 30 cases. This indicates that the role of trading pressure is rather market-specific. However, 
the benchmark measures, i.e. the basis and the 4-week average basis, show insignificance in all 
markets except only one case.  The trading of commodity futures may be more strongly affected by 
open interest than the basis, contrary to Alizadeh & Nomikos’s (2004) findings for the stock index 
futures markets12. The reason for this difference could be that the stock index futures market has 
stronger presence of hedgers than the commodity futures markets, which are more likely to respond to 
changing level of basis risk than speculators13.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Table 5 presents the estimates of the two important coefficients (φ and λ) obtained from the 
models with the four selected pressure measures (HSI50, AHGP4, SSI50 and ASCP4)14 based on 
relative significance. The estimated values of φ1 show that a state with a stronger short-term spot-
futures relationship (state 1) is indeed closer to a one-to-one relationship between spot and futures 
returns. Relatively small estimates of φ1 in the natural gas markets may indicate that the spot prices 
for natural gas are more strongly affected by non-market factors such as weather, seasonality and 
inventories (Brown & Yücel, 2008). In general, net long hedging pressure works as a destabilising 
force on the existing spot-futures relationship by triggering a transition, while net long speculative 
pressure stabilises it by preventing a transition15, except for the case of the gold markets. However, 
each market exhibits a unique response to the pressures. For example, in the copper markets, hedgers’ 
net long pressure is likely to cause a transition from state 2 to state 1, but speculators’ net long 
pressure is likely to sustain state 2. A possible explanation is that commercial buyers of coppers, who 
tend to take a long position in both spot (for current use) and futures (for future consumption) markets, 
restore a closer link between the two markets. Speculators who take long positions in the copper 
futures market may not operate in the spot market and thus weaken the link.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
                                                     
12 According to Alizadeh & Nomikos’ (2004) results, the 4-week average basis significantly affects a transition 
from state 2 (weaker) to state 1 (stronger relationship) in a sample which covers stock index futures markets. 
They did not test the pressure measures. 
13 The ratios of hedgers’ open interest to total reportable open interest are 0.62 and 0.57 in energy and metal 
futures markets in the sample period, respectively. However, those in S&P500 and NASDAQ100 futures 
markets are 0.83 and 0.81, respectively.  
14 Absolute hedging and speculative pressures, |(HSI or SSI) -0.5| and |AHGP and ASCP|, are also tested. The 
results are available upon request from the authors.  
15 It can also be said that net short speculative pressure destabilises the spot-futures relationship and net short 
hedging pressure stabilises it. These contrasting effects are also consistent with the explanation given in Section 
2. 
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The energy markets share similar properties with the copper market but with slight differences. 
Net long pressure from hedgers increases a transition from state 1 to state 2, but pressure from 
speculators is more likely to sustain in state 1. That is, when hedgers’ long positions dominate the 
energy futures markets, this weakens the link between spot and futures returns, possibly because long 
hedgers in the oil and gas markets respond to external shocks, e.g. weather shocks, differently from 
cash buyers. However, speculators may respond symmetrically to an economy-wide demand shock in 
both markets.  
In the gold markets, the impacts are reversed. In both transitions between state 1 and state 2, net 
long hedging pressure stabilises an ongoing relationship, while speculators’ net long pressure is likely 
to trigger a transition. A possible explanation is that gold contracts are also traded to hedge against 
inflation and exchange risks and are thus influenced by economic factors and central bank policies 
(Ciner, 2001). For example, rising inflation increases the demand from hedgers for gold in both spot 
and futures markets and thus stabilises the spot-futures relationship. However, speculators may use 
futures contracts rather than spot contracts when they are bullish. The role of gold also explains why 
gold markets behave differently from silver in our sample, as shown in Narayan, Narayan & Zheng 
(2010)’s study. 
Table 6 provides the selected estimation results for the same model, as shown in Equations (9) 
and (12), when both the pressure measures and the basis are used in the transition probability 
equations. In general, the measures of hedging and speculative pressure maintain their significance 
even in the presence of basis measures. However, a loss of significance shows the role of trading 
pressure could be market-specific and particularly not robust in the copper markets16.   
(Insert Table 6 here) 
  
5. The application in minimum variance hedging 
The empirical analysis in Section 4 has revealed that hedging and speculating activities 
significantly affect the spot-futures relationship. This implies that pressure measures can be applied to 
the models used in empirical finance to improve their performance. For example, trading pressure 
(hedging and speculative pressures) may enhance the performance of the minimum variance hedge 
                                                     
16 This may be due to relatively strong correlation between pressure measures and the basis in the copper 
markets where the highest positive correlation is observed between speculators’ open interest and the basis. The 
correlation is 0.157 in the copper markets, but the next highest one is 0.045 in the gold markets. 
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ratio (MVH) in terms of improving its hedging effectiveness. This is feasible since the MVH is 
derived from the spot-futures relationship, as shown in Equation (3).  
The aim of hedging is to reduce the risk associated with investment portfolios as a hedger is 
traditionally specified as a pure risk minimiser (Ederington, 1979). One of the hedging strategies used 
in the futures market involves taking opposite positions in the spot and the futures markets for the 
same underlying asset. Gains or losses in the spot market are hedged by the opposing movement in 
the futures market. To decide how much to buy or sell in each market, a hedger has to calculate a 
hedge ratio which is the ratio of the futures contracts to buy/sell to one contract of the same size of 
underlying assets to sell/buy. It is commonly supposed that spot market holdings are fixed and that a 
hedger decides futures market holdings (Ederington, 1979). 
If a hedger holds φ futures contracts per 1 spot contract, φ is his hedge ratio. The return on the 
hedged portfolio is calculated as follows: 
,p t t tr S Fϕ= ∆ − ∆   (13) 
The variance of the hedged portfolio is: 
2 2 2 2 2p S F SFσ σ ϕ σ ϕσ= + −   (14) 
where σ2S and σ2F are the variances of spot and futures returns, respectively, and σSF is the covariance 
between them.  
The minimum variance hedge ratio (MVH) is the value of φ that minimises σ2p. It is obtained by 
solving the first order conditions for the minimisation of σ2p in Equation (14). It is the ratio of the 
covariances between the spot and futures returns to the variance of futures returns. 
2
( , )
var( )
t t SF
t
t F
cov S F
F
σ
ϕ
σ
∆ ∆
= =
∆
  (15) 
The MVH can also be obtained by estimating the value of φ in the following linear regression model, 
which is done by rewriting Equation (13) and adding the random error term ut.  
t t tS F uµ ϕ∆ = + ∆ +   (16) 
where 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2). This is identical to the spot-futures relationship specified in Equation (3). As 
long as the spot-futures relationship in Equation (16) remains constant, there will be one estimated 
MVH value that minimises a hedger’s portfolio risk i.e., static hedging. However, it is unrealistic to 
assume that the MVH will remain constant over time.  
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Two models are popularly used to provide the time-varying MVH for dynamic hedging: GARCH 
and Markov regime switching (MRS) models. Multivariate GARCH models are associated with time-
varying covariances and variances, as in Equation (15), and consequently generate dynamic hedge 
ratios (Gray, 1996; Kavussanos & Nomikos, 2000; Park & Switzer, 1995). For example, Park and 
Switzer (1995) use a bivariate constant correlation GARCH(1,1) model. However, GARCH-based 
models can produce MVHs which are overly volatile and thus incur excessive transaction costs (Lien, 
2009).  
Markov regime switching models of the spot-futures relationship considered in Sections 1 and 2 
also generate a dynamic hedge ratio, which is the value of φ in Equation (8). Since two states exist, 
MRS models actually provide two separate minimum variance hedge ratios (MVH) conditional on 
different states, namely, φ1 and φ2. The hedging effectiveness of φ1 and φ2 could be separately 
evaluated in each corresponding regime, but this may not be useful since the hedgers must consider 
the time-varying probability of being in a specific regime given the conditional transition probabilities. 
Therefore, a dynamic MVH is calculated as a weighted-average of two state-dependent MVHs where 
weights are time-varying regime probabilities (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2004; Alizadeh et al., 2008). 
,1 1 ,1 2(1 )t t tϕ π ϕ π ϕ= + −  (17) 
where πt,1 and (1- πt,1) are the regime probabilities that a state is either 1 or 2, respectively, or in other 
words, Pr(st=1) and Pr(st=2). The regime probabilities are generated as by-products in the estimation 
process. 
The MRS models with trading pressures (MRS-TP), specified in Equations (9) and (12), can also 
provide the MVH under the same approach shown above. Note that the pressure measures are 
included individually in the MRS-TP models. The hedging effectiveness of the MVH derived from 
the MRS-TP models can then be tested against that of the MVHs obtained from other hedging 
strategies. Dynamic hedging strategies such as the MRS model without trading pressure and 
multivariate GARCH model are used as benchmarks. Also, three static hedging strategies are 
employed. Firstly, the naïve hedging strategy involves buying one futures contract per one spot 
contract and not changing the hedge ratios over time, i.e. φ =1 for all t values. Secondly, the static 
OLS strategy estimates φ in the following equation using historical data and maintains the same MVH, 
which is a non-MRS version of Equation (9):  
1t t t tS F b uµ ϕ λ −∆ = + ∆ + +  (18) 
Lastly, a univariate GARCH model, which allows for heteroscedasticity, is estimated with the mean 
equation (Equation (18)) to generate the MVH using Equation (15).   
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These strategies are simple to implement and do not incur transaction costs from rebalancing. 
However, they have a clear disadvantage in that the static hedge ratio may not be appropriate if the 
market conditions change frequently. Therefore, five dynamic hedging strategies are additionally 
tested: the MRS with constant transition probabilities; the MRS with time-varying probabilities with 
the basis or the 4-week average basis; and two strategies based on multivariate GARCH models – the 
diagonal BEKK and dynamic conditional correlation (DCC). 
The performances of the derived MVHs are evaluated using several evaluation methods, both in-
sample and out-of-sample methods. First, we compare the reduction in the variances of the hedged 
portfolio returns. The variances of the hedged portfolio (σ2p) are calculated as: 
var( )t t tS Fϕ∆ − ∆  (19) 
where t=1 to T for in-sample performance and t=T+1 to T+h for out-of-sample performance, and 
where T is the number of in-sample observations and h is the length of the forecasting period.  
Second, if a hedger is a utility maximiser, as commonly assumed in economics and finance 
literature, rather than a pure risk minimiser, a measure for utility may be more appropriate as this also 
considers the expected returns, the level of risk perceived by the traders and their degree of risk 
aversion as part of the hedgers’ utility (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2004; Kroner & Sultan, 1993; Salvador 
& Aragó, 2014). It is calculated as: 
1 1 1[ ( )] [ ] var( )t t tE U x E x xκ+ + += −  (20) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = Δ𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 − 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡Δ𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡, the return to a hedged portfolio, and κ is the degree of risk aversion. A 
hedger’s expected utility increases in terms of expected return but decreases in risk. Following 
Alizadeh & Nomikos (2004), Alizadeh et al. (2008), Lee (2010), Salvador & Aragó (2014) and a 
number of other papers in hedging performance, it is assumed that the expected hedged portfolio 
return is zero and the degree of risk aversion κ is 417. 
Lastly, we also adopt a measure frequently used by practitioners, such as in Cotter & Hanly’s 
(2006) study: namely, the value at risk (VaR) which represents the amount of investment exposed to a 
pre-specified level of risk. The value of the VaR, given initial wealth (W0) and confidence level (α), is 
calculated as follows: 
                                                     
17 Following one of the anonymous reviewer’s comment, we also release the zero return restriction on hedged 
portfolio. We use historical mean returns as the expected returns to calculate hedger’s utility and is available 
upon request. 
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𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 = 𝑊𝑊0(𝐸𝐸[𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1] + 𝑍𝑍𝛼𝛼�var(𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1)) (21) 
where Zα is the quantile of normal distribution at α. W0 is assumed to be $ 1 million in this study and 
Z is -1.645 given a 95% confidence level.    
The MRS models with pressure measures, expressed in Equations (9) and (12), are first estimated 
as explained in Section 2. As a result, the regime probabilities are obtained. In Figure 5, the regime 
probabilities of the MRS model with HSI50 are presented as an example. The patterns of regime 
probability are unique in each market, indicating that the change in the spot-futures relationship could 
be market-specific. Once the regime probabilities and the coefficient φ of the MRS models are 
estimated, the MVHs for hedging are calculated using Equation (17). Since the transition probabilities 
are affected by hedging and speculative pressures, the estimated MVHs reflect both the changes in 
those pressures and the transition between the two different states. As an example, Figure 6 presents 
the MVHs obtained using the MRS model with HSI50. The hedge ratios for copper, crude oil and 
heating oil move around 1 while the ratios for gold, silver and natural gas are smaller than the naive 
hedge. All the hedge ratios exhibit some mean-reverting characteristics.  
 (Insert Figure 5 here) 
(Insert Figure 6 here)  
Table 7 (below) shows the reduction in the variance of a hedged portfolio calculated using 
Equation (19). The results obtained from benchmark models such as: naive; OLS; univariate GARCH; 
simple MRS; multivariate GARCH-BEKK; and DCC, are also presented. The MVH derived from the 
MRS-TP using hedging or speculative pressure, generated the largest variance reduction in energy 
markets (Panel B) in terms of the market average (70.901%). In particular, the reduction is stronger 
for out-of-sample testing, where the model outperforms all other MRS-based benchmarks. The MRS 
model with trading pressures performs the best for in-sample and out-of-sample analysis, for crude oil 
market. However, in the heating oil and natural gas markets, the MRS models generally do not 
outperform simpler models like the OLS. The performance MRS-TP for the metal markets (Panel A) 
is also among the best, following the DCC model and is similar to MRS with average basis. In silver 
market, the MRS model with ASCP is the best among all models, for both in-sample and out-of-
sample analysis. The increase in the hedgers’ utility level (Equation (20)) is presented in Table 8. The 
results are similar to that in Table 7. The MRS-TP hedge ratios can achieve great utility improvement, 
especially for energy markets.  
(Insert Table 7  here) 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
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Table 9 shows the results of the VaR reduction of Equation (21). It is found that the all the four 
MRS-TP model outperforms other models in the energy markets (ranked 1st to 4th in average 
improvement), and it is mostly due to its superior out-of-sample performance. The reduction in the 
VaR of MRS-TP models in the metal markets is also very strong. They outperform the other non-
MRS benchmarks and MRS with AHGP is the best among all competing models, but the difference 
from the benchmark MRS models is very small. The results support the usefulness of MRS-TP model 
in managing the financial risk of energy and metal markets.  
(Insert Table 9 here) 
In summary, hedging and speculative pressure play a significant role in the transition of the spot-
futures relationship in metal and energy markets. In general, hedgers’ net long pressure increases the 
transition probabilities, but speculators’ net long pressure decreases them. However, some variation is 
observed across the markets. For example, the impacts of the pressures are reversed in the gold 
markets. This indicates that the findings could be market-specific rather than universal. Trading 
pressure is utilised in the transition probability equations of the MRS models to provide the minimum 
variance hedge ratios. The MVHs improve hedging effectiveness in terms of a smaller variance and 
lower VaR, for the energy markets in particular, but they only have a limited effect in the metal 
markets where the benefits are occasionally weaker than those obtained by simpler strategies.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of hedging and speculative pressure on the spot-futures 
relationship, specifically in three metal (copper, gold and silver) and three energy (crude oil, heating 
oil and natural gas) markets. In particular, two different measures of trading pressures under five 
different moving windows are calculated using hedgers’ and speculators’ open interests. These 
measures are then incorporated into the Markov regime switching models to determine the time-
varying transition probabilities. We further examine the performance of the optimal hedge ratios 
generated from the Markov regime switching models with trading pressures. 
Our results show that metal and energy markets, particularly the copper, gold, crude oil and 
natural gas markets, are strongly subject to the impact of hedging and speculative pressures. Net long 
pressure from hedgers is more likely to destabilise the spot-futures relationship, i.e., lead to a 
transition to another state. For example, it causes a switch to a stronger relationship in the copper 
markets and to a weaker relationship in the gold, crude oil and natural gas markets. Conversely, net 
long speculative pressure can stabilise the current state of the spot-futures relationship. These findings 
are consistent with the view that speculators have a stabilising impact, as suggested by Friedman 
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(1953) and Cox (1976). However, hedgers and speculators have the opposite effect in the gold 
markets, possibly because traders in the gold market are more subject to government policies and 
macroeconomic factors such as inflation and exchange rate risk (Ciner, 2001).  
The findings also have practical implications. Essentially, hedging and speculative pressures 
should be considered by hedgers and investors who cover both spot and futures markets, as trading 
pressures could change an existing spot-futures relationship. In particular, the minimum variance 
hedge ratios generated by the MRS models with hedging and speculative pressures have been tested 
against various hedging models. A reduction in the portfolio variance, hedger’s utility and VaR is 
observed for both in-sample and out-of-sample data in the energy markets, but the effect is weak in 
the metal markets. Financial risk managers who adopt hedge ratios generated from our model can 
achieve greater variance reduction and better hedging performance. For future research, further 
investigation into the use of hedging and speculative pressures can provide practical benefits in terms 
of understanding return and volatility predictability (Manera, Nicolini, & Vignati, 2016; Wang, 2004), 
and other hedging and feedback trading strategies (Pan et al., 2014), among many other topics that are 
related to the spot-futures relationship.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of spot and futures returns and cointegration tests 
Panel A Metal Markets          
  Copper 
 
Gold 
 
Silver   
  Spot Futures Spot Futures Spot Futures 
Mean 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013 
Sts. Dev.  0.0386 0.0374 0.0237 0.0236 0.0415 0.0426 
Skewness -0.7770 -0.7905 -0.1692 -0.0865 -1.0320 -1.1770 
Kurtosis 7.3195 7.5809 7.7556 5.8087 8.7801 10.0873 
JB stat 915.8 1020.6 987.8 344.1 1637.0 2423.7 
Q(4) p-value 0.0010 0.0260 0.3740 0.4870 0.5270 0.4720 
ADF(4) p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Johansen trace test - log price           
 H0: r=0 (p-value) 0.0001   0.0001   0.0001   
H0: r=1 (p-value) 0.8600   0.5372   0.8509   
Coefficient - spot prices -1.0038   -1.0011   -0.9984   
       Panel B Energy Markets         
  Crude Oil   Heating Oil Natural Gas   
  Spot Futures Spot Futures Spot Futures 
Mean 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018 0.0007 0.0007 
Sts. Dev.  0.0523 0.0503 0.0604 0.0486 0.1100 0.0738 
Skewness -0.2661 -0.7003 -1.4657 -0.2992 2.2913 0.0073 
Kurtosis 7.7023 7.3307 43.0343 4.8528 47.7888 3.8894 
JB stat 973.3 900.3 70026.2 164.7 88091.7 34.4 
Q(4) p-value 0.0010 0.0610 0.0000 0.0750 0.0000 0.4260 
ADF(4) p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Johansen trace test - log price           
 H0: r=0 (p-value) 0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   
H0: r=1 (p-value) 0.6375   0.6464   0.1575   
Coefficient - spot prices -0.9991   -0.9943   -0.9927   
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of spot and futures returns. Std. Dev. denotes the standard 
deviation of returns, JB statistic is Jarque-Bera statistic and Q(4) is the Ljung-Box test with 4 lags. ADF is the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test with 4 lags. Cointegration is tested between spot and futures log prices by 
Johansen trace tests. r is the number of cointegrating vectors. Coefficients are the normalised coefficients of spot 
prices where the cointegrating vector is [1, 0, -1]. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the measure of hedging and speculative pressures, net open 
interest and total open interest 
 
  Metal Markets     Energy Markets   
   Copper Gold Silver   Crude Oil Heating Oil Natural Gas 
HSI50  Mean 0.5366 0.5061 0.5503 
 
0.4839 0.5218 0.5282 
 
 Std. Dev. 0.3398 0.3170 0.3134 
 
0.3018 0.2895 0.3165 
HSI12  Mean 0.5055 0.5173 0.5268 
 
0.4923 0.4924 0.5158 
 
 Std. Dev. 0.3820 0.3801 0.3870  0.3757 0.3737 0.3992 
AHGP50  Mean -0.0914 -0.2463 -0.4858 
 
-0.0234 -0.0848 0.0123 
 
 Std. Dev. 0.1547 0.2796 0.1134 
 
0.0394 0.0444 0.1183 
AHGP12  Mean -0.0875 -0.2544 -0.4837 
 
-0.0254 -0.0832 0.0197 
 
 Std. Dev. 0.1843 0.2949 0.1427 
 
0.0521 0.0588 0.1240 
AHGP4  Mean -0.0728 -0.2469 -0.4496 
 
-0.0417 -0.0823 0.0211 
   Std. Dev. 0.1930 0.2890 0.1729  0.0723 0.0710 0.1246 
SSI50  Mean 0.4634 0.4903 0.4459 
 
0.5210 0.4746 0.4604 
 
 Std. Dev. 0.3384 0.3173 0.3111 
 
0.2963 0.2895 0.3222 
SSI12  Mean 0.4848 0.4813 0.4767 
 
0.5071 0.5068 0.4867 
   Std. Dev. 0.3851 0.3801 0.3826  0.3714 0.3708 0.3983 
ASCP50  Mean 0.1179 0.2209 0.5367 
 
0.0987 0.1917 -0.0897 
 
 Std. Dev. 0.2749 0.4732 0.1829 
 
0.1738 0.2531 0.3170 
ASCP12  Mean 0.1120 0.2375 0.5334 
 
0.1006 0.1900 -0.1068 
 
 Std. Dev. 0.3428 0.5040 0.2333 
 
0.2346 0.3264 0.3749 
ASCP4  Mean 0.1006 0.2482 0.5150 
 
0.1496 0.1765 -0.0896 
   Std. Dev. 0.3517 0.4998 0.2578  0.2914 0.3600 0.4046 
NOI  Mean -5942.39 -98016.57 -42409.94  -60544.97 -19542.45 24330.36 
   Std. Dev. 18675.16 102292.81 18750.34  100179.85 18362.58 67648.51 
TOI  Mean 135745.80 439697.20 140548.10  1217935.00 285166.70 691507.10 
   Std. Dev. 46696.07 225231.50 29315.14  534064.40 105635.20 291756.40 
Notes: HSI and AHGP are the measures of hedging pressure: hedgers’ trading pressure index and average 
hedging pressure shown in Equation (4) and (6). SSI and ASCP are the measures of speculative pressure: 
speculators’ trading pressure index and average speculative pressure shown in Equation (5) and (7). The suffix 
number indicates the number of weeks used as a moving window to calculate a value of each measure. NOI is 
net open interest as long less short open interest. TOI is total open interest as a sum of hedgers’ or speculators’ 
open interests. 
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Table 3. The impact of hedging and speculative pressures on the transition probabilities of 
spot-futures relationship  
       Metal           Energy     Index  Copper   Gold   Silver   Crude Oil   Heating Oil Natural Gas 
Hedging HSI50  β1 -0.9945  -1.8959 *** -0.7340  0.3280  1.9309 ** 3.0039 *** 
Pressure    p-value 0.1720  0.0079  0.2739  0.3232  0.0279  0.0098  
     β2 -0.9431  -3.7247 *** -0.5526  -0.5642  -0.6183  0.4612  
     p-value 0.1339  0.0051  0.7813  0.5639  0.6011  0.5492  
  HSI12  β1 -0.1326  -1.4903 ** -0.7958  0.1892  0.8415  1.7890 * 
     p-value 0.8288  0.0144  0.1287  0.4914  0.1673  0.0534  
     β2 -1.2425 * -2.0986 ** 3.6540  -0.0001  -1.1870  0.4292  
     p-value 0.0650  0.0323  1.0000  0.9998  0.1501  0.4857  
  AHGP50  β1 -0.6463  1.1589  2.3577  9.2688 *** -2.0316  0.3408  
     p-value 0.6551  0.3099  0.2510  0.0022  0.6895  0.8729  
     β2 6.6271 *** -1.0336  -0.2086  -0.1938  0.0360  -0.6166  
     p-value 0.0000  0.1838  0.9699  0.9755  0.9951  0.7608  
  AHGP12  β1 0.0922  -1.3804 * 2.2702 * 7.1589 *** 1.5057  1.0578  
     p-value 0.9398  0.0594  0.0575  0.0012  0.7169  0.5972  
     β2 4.7843 *** -0.0001  -0.0991  -0.3006  0.4481  -0.7581  
     p-value 0.0003  0.9999  0.9867  0.9468  0.9309  0.7121  
  AHGP4  β1 2.1353 * -0.5206  1.7976  6.0951 *** 2.4298  1.9516  
     p-value 0.0759  0.6824  0.1084  0.0017  0.5909  0.3356  
     β2 5.6726 *** -1.6749 ** 0.0223  -4.8553  0.2266  -0.0059  
     p-value 0.0000  0.0214  0.9964  0.2826  0.9624  0.9976  
Speculative SSI50  β1 -1.6905 ** 1.9837 *** -1.0688 * -0.2943  -1.4100 * -2.9696 *** 
Pressure    p-value 0.0221  0.0051  0.0941  0.3799  0.0724  0.0060  
     β2 -1.6324 ** 4.0243 *** 1.0349  0.5900  -0.0027  -0.6327  
     p-value 0.0270  0.0042  0.7024  0.5543  0.9980  0.3796  
  SSI12  β1 -0.2146  1.4875 ** -0.0921  -0.2652  1.1057  -2.7656 *** 
     p-value 0.6982  0.0165  0.8592  0.3376  0.1889  0.0035  
     β2 -1.6816 ** 2.1677 ** 2.4319  0.0912  -0.8513  -0.7235  
     p-value 0.0324  0.0283  0.3025  0.8838  0.1457  0.2514  
  ASCP50  β1 -0.7570  0.4440  -0.3033  -1.2537 ** -0.2492  0.2918  
     p-value 0.3191  0.3228  0.9577  0.0325  0.7552  0.7160  
     β2 -5.0992 *** -0.7804  -0.5236  0.3241  -1.6892  0.6450  
     p-value 0.0000  0.2359  0.6071  0.7848  0.1529  0.3696  
  ASCP12  β1 -0.8378  0.5390  -0.5236  -0.9953 ** -0.0938  -0.2170  
     p-value 0.1920  0.1965  0.6071  0.0196  0.9012  0.7143  
     β2 -1.2637 * -0.3805  -0.3033  0.6166  -1.1935  0.1001  
     p-value 0.0572  0.5621  0.9577  0.4562  0.2015  0.8791  
  ASCP4  β1 -1.0362 * 0.6858 * -0.1656  -0.7678 ** -0.4653  -0.9774  
     p-value 0.0943  0.0998  0.9663  0.0371  0.4743  0.1465  
     β2 -1.7958 *** -0.0002  0.4317  0.7591  -0.8347  -0.2209  
     p-value 0.0064  0.9998  0.6183  0.3537  0.2643  0.7031  
Benchmark Basis  β1 2.5269  0.0541  0.9749  -0.0812  -2.6234 * 0.2679  
     p-value 0.2685  0.9999  0.7759  0.9998  0.0855  0.8272  
     β2 1.0328  -0.0002  -0.2423  0.0637  1.1605  2.3840  
     p-value 0.6449  1.0000  0.9723  0.9988  0.5874  0.8254  
  AvgBasis  β1 2.3357  0.0548  1.3873  0.6053  1.4397  0.7876  
     p-value 0.2673  0.9999  0.6388  0.9908  0.3507  0.5989  
     β2 1.1793  -0.0002  -1.4857  0.0472  0.3603  -2.2019  
     p-value 0.6222  1.0000  0.9992  0.9996  0.8672  0.7079  
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Notes: This table summarises the significance of net long hedging and speculative pressures in the transition 
probability equations in the MRS model of the spot-futures relationship, HSI and SSI are hedgers’ and 
speculators’ trading pressure index by Wang (2001), shown in Equation (4) and (5). AHGP and ASCP are an 
average of hedging and speculative pressures by De Roon et al. (2000), shown in Equation (6) and (7). The 
suffix shows the number of weeks used as a moving window. β1 and β2  are the estimates of the coefficient in 
the transition probability equations. P-values are shown below the estimated coefficients. Two benchmarks we 
used are the basis (Basis) and the 4-week average basis (AvgBasis) as in Alizadeh & Nomikos (2004). ***, ** 
and * indicates the statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Summary: the statistical significance of hedging and speculative pressures in Table 3 
   Metal     Energy     
  Index   Copper Gold Silver Crude Oil Heating Oil Natural Gas 
Hedging  HSI50 β1  ---   ++ +++ Pressure   β2   ---         
 HSI12 β1  --    + 
   β2 - --         
 AHGP50 β1    +++   
   β2 +++           
 AHGP12 β1  - + +++   
   β2 +++           
 AHGP4 β1 +   +++       β2 +++ --         
Speculative SSI50 β1 -- +++ -  - --- Pressure   β2 -- +++         
 SSI12 β1  ++    --- 
   β2 -- ++         
 ASCP50 β1    --   
   β2 ---           
 ASCP12 β1    --   
   β2 -           
 ASCP4 β1 + +  --       β2 ---           
Benchmark Basis β1     -  
   β2             
 AvgBasis β1           β2             
Notes: This table summarises the findings in Table 3. + and - indicate the positive and negative impact of the net 
long pressure on the transition of the spot-futures relationship, respectively. β1 and β2  are the estimates of the 
coefficient in the transition probability equations.  +++ and --- indicate the statistical significance at 1% level 
and ++ and -- indicate the statistical significance at 5% level. + and – mean the significance at 10% level. Refer 
to Table 3 for more details.  
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Table 5. Estimation results of the MRS model with hedging and speculative pressures 
      
Metal           Energy   
  Index Copper  Gold  Silver  
Crude 
Oil  
Heating 
Oil  
Natural 
Gas   
Hedging HSI50 ϕ1 1.0046 *** 1.0046 *** 0.9606 *** 1.0008 ** 1.0118 *** 0.8693 *** 
Pressure    λ1 0.4558 *** 0.4558 *** 0.9718 *** 0.9974 *** 0.5823 *** 0.4273 *** 
  ϕ2 0.9602 *** 0.9602 *** 0.8228 *** 0.8946 *** 0.9157 *** 0.8449 *** 
  λ2 0.4358 *** 0.4358 *** 0.9215 *** 1.0261 *** 0.5829 *** 0.7746 *** 
  β1 -0.9945  -1.8959 *** -0.7340  0.3280  1.9309 **  3.0039 *** 
   β2 -0.9431  -3.7247 *** -0.5526  -0.5642  -0.6183  0.4612  
  AHGP4 ϕ1 1.0032 *** 1.0032 *** 0.9566 *** 1.0008 *** 1.0124 *** 0.8714 *** 
    λ1 0.4558 *** 0.4558 *** 0.9718 *** 0.9974 *** 0.5825 *** 0.4298 *** 
  ϕ2 0.9663 *** 0.9663 *** 0.8830 *** 0.8957 *** 0.9152 *** 0.8451 *** 
  λ2 0.4358 *** 0.4358 *** 0.9217 *** 1.0260 ** 0.5824 *** 0.7652 *** 
  β1 2.1353 * -0.5206  1.7976  6.0951 *** 2.4298  1.9516  
    β2 5.6726 *** -1.6749 **  0.0223  -4.8553  0.2266  -0.0059  
Speculative SSI50 ϕ1 1.0039 *** 0.9401 *** 0.9495 *** 1.0008 *** 1.0116 *** 0.8712 *** 
Pressure    λ1 0.4504 *** 0.9603 *** 0.9607 *** 0.9974 *** 0.5603 *** 0.4278 *** 
  ϕ2 0.9565 *** 0.8723 *** 0.8364 *** 0.8943 *** 0.9161 *** 0.8437 *** 
  λ2 0.4102 *** 1.1751 *** 0.9134  1.0261 ** 0.5707 *** 0.7702 *** 
  β1 -1.6905 ** 1.9837 *** -1.0688 * 0.5900  -1.4100 * -2.9696 *** 
   β2 -1.6324 ** 4.0243 *** 1.0349  -0.2943  -0.0027  -0.6327  
  ASCP4 ϕ1 1.0035 *** 0.9389 *** 0.9596 *** 1.0008 *** 1.0129 *** 0.8701 *** 
    λ1 0.4558 *** 0.9578 *** 0.9607 *** 0.9974 *** 0.5824 *** 0.4292 *** 
  ϕ2 0.9800 *** 0.8737 *** 0.8056 *** 0.8951 *** 0.9124 *** 0.8448 *** 
  λ2 0.4358 *** 1.1485 *** 0.9140 *** 1.0266 ** 0.5824 *** 0.7632 *** 
  β1 -1.0362 * 0.6858 * 0.4317  -0.7678 ** -0.4653  -0.9774  
    β2 -1.7958 *** -0.0002  -0.1656  0.7591  -0.8347  -0.2209  
Notes: This table shows the estimation results of the MRS models with the selected measures of hedging and 
speculative pressures. φs and λs are the estimated coefficients in state s in Equation (9). β1 and β2  are the 
estimates of the coefficient in the transition probability equations. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 6. The significance of the selected hedging and speculative pressures against the basis-based 
measures in the nested models.  
    Metal     Energy     
    Index   Copper Gold Silver Crude Oil Heating Oil 
Natural 
Gas 
Hedging  Pair 1 HSI50 β1  ---   ++ ++ Pressure   β2   ---         
  Basis β1       
     β2             
 Pair 2 AHGP4 β1    +++   
   β2   --         
  Basis β1             β2             
Speculative Pair 3 SSI50 β1  +++ ---   -- Pressure   β2   +++     --   
  Basis β2       
     β2             
 Pair 4 ASCP4 β1    --   
   β2             
  Basis β1             β2             
Notes: This table presents the statistical significance of pressure measures when both pressures and basis-based 
measures are incorporated the transition probability equations, Equation (12). β1 and β2  are the estimates of the 
coefficient in the transition probability equations.   + and – indicate the positive impact of the measures on the 
transition of spot-futures relationship, respectively. +++ and --- indicate the statistical significance at 1% level. 
++ and -- represent the statistical significance at 5% level. + and – mean the significance at 10% level. Grey-
shaded cells indicate the loss of significance compared with Table 4 and Table 5.  
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Table 7. Variance reduction of the hedged portfolios  
Panel A: Metal              
     Copper   Gold   Silver   Average 
     In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample  
 Unhedged variance 0.00164 0.00068 0.00061 0.00064 0.00185 0.00125 
 Naive   93.146% 37.152% 82.316% 90.765% 90.068% 94.830% 81.380% 
OLS   93.161% 37.622% 83.058% 90.076% 90.513% 95.474% 81.651% 
GARCH   91.348% 38.180% 84.709% 89.496% 90.897% 95.460% 81.682% 
BEKK   92.875% 38.933% 84.102% 86.448% 90.545% 94.705% 81.268% 
DCC   92.839% 40.806% 83.483% 90.207% 90.426% 95.328% 82.182% 
MRS   93.238% 39.240% 83.085% 90.142% 90.704% 95.482% 81.982% 
MRS-TP HPI50 93.225% 39.373% 83.002% 90.123% 90.988% 95.401% 82.019% 
  AHGP4 93.212% 39.299% 83.055% 90.208% 90.775% 95.498% 82.008% 
  SPI50 93.217% 39.553% 83.001% 90.131% 90.862% 95.480% 82.041% 
  ASCP4 93.194% 39.415% 83.049% 90.194% 91.007% 95.497% 82.059% 
  Basis 92.846% 39.429% 83.033% 90.170% 90.710% 95.436% 81.937% 
  AvgBasis 93.241% 39.970% 83.034% 90.170% 90.766% 95.487% 82.111% 
        Panel B: Energy              
 
    Crude Oil 
 
Heating Oil 
 
Natural Gas 
 
Average 
     In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample  
 Unhedged variance   0.00307         0.00081     0.00423        0.00071     0.00974  0.00395 
 Naive  90.530% 77.588% 63.450% 88.882% 37.660% 61.262% 69.895% 
OLS   90.550% 78.037% 63.432% 89.116% 39.605% 64.214% 70.826% 
GARCH   90.441% 78.129% 68.072% 82.086% 14.839% 63.934% 66.250% 
BEKK   89.273% 78.359% 52.520% 83.680% 32.153% 62.320% 66.384% 
DCC   90.839% 78.223% 59.954% 89.483% 39.722% 63.650% 70.312% 
MRS   90.740% 78.259% 63.363% 88.894% 39.619% 64.095% 70.828% 
MRS-TP HPI50 90.740% 78.617% 63.356% 88.905% 39.619% 64.112% 70.892% 
  AHGP4 90.739% 78.893% 63.361% 88.901% 39.615% 64.094% 70.934% 
  SPI50 90.740% 78.610% 63.354% 88.926% 39.627% 64.106% 70.894% 
  ASCP4 90.739% 78.682% 63.358% 88.908% 39.616% 64.106% 70.901% 
  Basis 90.740% 78.256% 63.345% 88.931% 39.628% 64.090% 70.832% 
  AvgBasis 90.740% 78.259% 63.342% 88.889% 39.624% 64.091% 70.824% 
Notes: This table summarises the reduction in the variances of hedged portfolios against unhedged portfolio 
where the minimum variance hedge ratios are calculated from different hedging models. MRS-TP models are 
the MRS models with hedging and speculative pressures. Unhedged variance is the variance of spot returns 
without employing any hedging strategy. HSI50 and SSI50 are 50-week hedgers’ and speculators’ trading 
pressure index by Wang (2001). AHGP4 and ASCP4 are a 4-week average of hedging and speculative pressures 
by De Roon et al. (2000). Basis and 4-week average basis (AvgBasis) are used for comparison following 
Alizadeh  & Nomikos (2004). The results from benchmark strategies are also presented. OLS is a static OLS 
method. GARCH is a univariate GARCH (1,1) and BEKK and DCC (dynamic conditional correlation) are 
multivariate GARCH models. The higher percentage reduction indicates the higher hedging effectiveness.  
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Table 8. Hedgers’ utility improvement in the hedged portfolio 
Panel A: Metal   
  Copper  Gold  Silver  Average 
  In Sample Out of Sample In Sample Out of Sample In Sample Out of Sample  
Unhedged utility -0.00656 -0.00263 -0.00243 -0.00255 -0.00739 -0.00499  
Naive  93.146% 37.152% 82.316% 90.765% 90.068% 94.830% 81.380% 
OLS  93.161% 37.622% 83.058% 90.076% 90.513% 95.474% 81.651% 
GARCH  91.348% 38.180% 84.709% 89.496% 90.897% 95.460% 81.682% 
BEKK  92.875% 38.933% 84.102% 86.448% 90.545% 94.705% 81.268% 
DCC  92.839% 40.806% 83.483% 90.207% 90.426% 95.328% 82.182% 
MRS  93.148% 38.105% 83.033% 90.170% 91.024% 95.402% 81.814% 
MRS-TP HPI50 93.237% 41.181% 83.012% 90.170% 91.094% 95.439% 82.356% 
 AHGP4 93.212% 39.299% 83.055% 90.208% 90.775% 95.498% 82.008% 
 SPI50 93.210% 41.077% 83.014% 90.201% 90.988% 95.525% 82.336% 
 ASCP4 93.194% 39.415% 83.049% 90.194% 91.007% 95.497% 82.059% 
 Basis 92.846% 39.429% 83.033% 90.170% 90.710% 95.436% 81.937% 
 AvgBasis 93.241% 39.970% 83.034% 90.170% 90.766% 95.487% 82.111% 
         
Panel B: Energy        
  Crude Oil  Heating Oil  Natural Gas  Average 
  In Sample Out of Sample In Sample Out of Sample In Sample Out of Sample  
Unhedged utility -0.01226 -0.00325 -0.01692 -0.00284 -0.03894 -0.01579  
Naive  90.530% 77.588% 63.450% 88.882% 37.660% 61.262% 69.895% 
OLS  90.550% 78.037% 63.432% 89.116% 39.605% 64.214% 70.826% 
GARCH  90.441% 78.129% 68.072% 82.086% 14.839% 63.934% 66.250% 
BEKK  89.273% 78.359% 52.520% 83.680% 32.153% 62.320% 66.384% 
DCC  90.839% 78.223% 59.954% 89.483% 39.722% 63.650% 70.312% 
MRS  90.740% 78.259% 63.363% 88.894% 39.619% 64.095% 70.828% 
MRS-TP HPI50 90.740% 78.374% 63.366% 88.871% 39.627% 64.095% 70.845% 
 AHGP4 90.739% 78.893% 63.361% 88.901% 39.615% 64.094% 70.934% 
 SPI50 90.740% 78.370% 63.351% 88.875% 39.638% 64.091% 70.844% 
 ASCP4 90.739% 78.682% 63.358% 88.908% 39.616% 64.106% 70.901% 
 Basis 90.740% 78.256% 63.345% 88.931% 39.628% 64.090% 70.832% 
 AvgBasis 90.740% 78.259% 63.342% 88.889% 39.624% 64.091% 70.824% 
Notes: This table summarises the improvement in hedger’s utility level from different hedging models, against 
unhedged portfolio. MRS-TP models are the MRS models with hedging and speculative pressures. Unhedged 
utility is the hedgers’ utility level when they do not employ any hedging strategy. HSI50 and SSI50 are 50-week 
hedgers’ and speculators’ trading pressure index by Wang (2001). AHGP4 and ASCP4 are 4-week average of 
hedging and speculative pressures by De Roon et al. (2000). Basis and 4-week average basis (AvgBasis) are 
used for comparison following Alizadeh & Nomikos (2004). The results from benchmark strategies are also 
presented. OLS is a static OLS method. GARCH is a univariate GARCH (1,1) and BEKK and DCC (dynamic 
conditional correlation) are multivariate GARCH models. The higher percentage improvement indicates the 
higher performance of hedging strategies.  
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Table 9. Reduction in Value at Risk (VaR) in the hedged portfolio 
Panel A: Metal 
           Copper 
 
Gold 
 
Silver 
 
 Average  
     In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample  
Unhedged VaR -666.370 -421.823 -405.750 -415.255 -707.053 -580.934 
 Naive  73.819% 20.723% 57.948% 69.511% 68.485% 77.263% 61.292% 
OLS   73.848% 21.020% 58.839% 68.498% 69.198% 78.726% 61.688% 
GARCH   70.586% 21.375% 60.896% 67.591% 69.828% 78.693% 61.495% 
BEKK   73.307% 21.854% 60.128% 63.187% 69.251% 76.989% 60.786% 
DCC   73.239% 23.063% 59.359% 68.707% 69.059% 78.385% 61.968% 
MRS   73.824% 21.326% 58.810% 68.648% 70.040% 78.556% 61.867% 
MRS-TP HPI50 73.972% 22.137% 58.771% 68.572% 69.980% 78.554% 61.998% 
  AHGP4 73.946% 22.089% 58.836% 68.708% 69.628% 78.782% 61.998% 
  SPI50 73.956% 22.253% 58.770% 68.586% 69.771% 78.739% 62.012% 
  ASCP4 73.911% 22.164% 58.829% 68.686% 70.012% 78.779% 62.064% 
  Basis 73.252% 22.172% 58.809% 68.648% 69.520% 78.638% 61.840% 
  AvgBasis 74.002% 22.521% 58.810% 68.648% 69.613% 78.756% 62.058% 
        Panel B: Energy          
 
    Crude Oil 
 
Heating Oil 
 
Natural Gas   Average      
     In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample   In Sample  Out of Sample      
Unhedged VaR -910.835 -469.115 -1070.028 -437.940 -1623.061 -1033.638 
 
    
Naive  69.226% 52.569% 39.544% 66.656% 21.111% 37.760% 47.811%     
OLS   69.258% 53.135% 39.529% 67.009% 22.286% 40.179% 48.566%     
GARCH   69.082% 53.233% 43.495% 57.675% 7.717% 39.945% 45.191%     
BEKK   67.248% 53.480% 31.094% 59.602% 17.631% 38.616% 44.612%     
DCC   69.732% 53.334% 36.718% 67.570% 22.361% 39.709% 48.238%     
MRS   69.569% 53.373% 39.472% 66.674% 22.295% 40.079% 48.577%     
MRS-TP HPI50 69.569% 53.759% 39.466% 66.691% 22.295% 40.093% 48.645%     
  AHGP4 69.568% 54.058% 39.470% 66.685% 22.292% 40.078% 48.692%     
  SPI50 69.569% 53.750% 39.464% 66.722% 22.300% 40.088% 48.649%     
  ASCP4 69.568% 53.828% 39.467% 66.696% 22.293% 40.088% 48.657%     
  Basis 69.569% 53.369% 39.457% 66.731% 22.300% 40.075% 48.584%     
  AvgBasis 69.569% 53.373% 39.454% 66.668% 22.298% 40.076% 48.573%     
Notes: This table summarises the reduction in Value at Risk (VaR)’s calculated from different hedging models, 
against unhedged. MRS-TP models are the MRS models with hedging and speculative pressures. Unhedged 
VaR is the hedgers’ VaR when they do not employ any hedging strategy. HSI50 and SSI50 are 50-week hedgers’ 
and speculators’ trading pressure index by Wang (2001). AHGP4 and ASCP4 are a 4-week average of hedging 
and speculative pressures by De Roon et al. (2000). Basis and 4-week average basis (AvgBasis) are used for 
comparison following Alizadeh  & Nomikos (2004). The results from benchmark strategies are also presented. 
OLS is a static OLS method. GARCH is a univariate GARCH (1,1) and BEKK and DCC (dynamic conditional 
correlation) are multivariate GARCH models. The higher percentage reduction in VaR indicates the smaller 
exposure of the hedgers’ portfolios to risk, so the higher hedging effectiveness.  
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Figure 1. Spot and futures prices – metal markets 
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Notes: The graphs show the patterns of log spot and futures prices in the metal markets. The sample period is 
between 1 March 1996 and 14 March 2014.   
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Figure 2. Spot and futures prices – energy markets 
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Notes: The graphs show the patterns of log spot and futures prices in the energy markets. The sample period is 
between 1 March 1996 and 14 March 2014.   
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Figure 3. Hedgers’ net open interest – metal and energy markets 
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Notes: The graphs show the pattern of hedgers’ net open interest calculated as commercial traders’ long interest 
less short interest. The sample period is between 1 March 1996 and 14 March 2014. 
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Figure 4. Speculators' net open interest – metal and energy markets 
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Notes: The graphs show the pattern of speculators’ net open interest calculated as non-commercial traders’ long 
interest less short interest. The sample period is between 1 March 1996 and 14 March 2014. 
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Figure 5. Regime probabilities that the spot-future relationship is in state 1 in the MRS model 
with hedging pressure (HSI50). 
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Notes: The graphs present regime probabilities that are smoothed probabilities conditional on all information in 
the sample. 
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Figure 6. The minimum variance hedge ratio (MVH) from the MRS models with hedging 
pressure (HSI50). 
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Notes: The graphs show the minimum variance hedge ratios (MVHs) from the MRS model with HSI50 as an 
example. It including out-of-sample MVHs (last 100 observations). A straight line is the MVH provided by the 
static OLS method as a benchmark.  
 
